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RACE AND THE DOCTRINE OF SELF DEFENSE:  THE ROLE OF RACE IN 
DETERMINING THE PROPER USE OF FORCE TO PROTECT ONESELF 
 
Richard Klein* 
  
A valid and appropriate use of self-defense justifies the use of force against 
another, even when such force results in death.1  But the force used must have been 
absolutely necessary in order to protect oneself, it cannot have been used as form of self-
help or as a display of vindictiveness to retaliate against an individual who may be 
standing as a symbol for a group that has treated an individual in negative, hostile ways 
in the past.  When Bernhard Goetz shot at 4 black youths in a subway car,2 was it because 
he truly believed such an action was necessary in order to protect himself from the 
infliction of serious harm?  And if indeed such was his personal belief, is that sufficient 
to justify his shootings or does the law require that the belief be a reasonable one 
supported by an objective standard?  When John White shot and killed Daniel Cicciaro3 
did he have a valid self-defense based, in part, on his knowledge of the lynching’s and 
attacks on blacks in the southern parts of the U.S. in prior decades? 
 
 Self-defense is classified as a necessity defense,4 the individual claiming the 
defense must have had no available option but to attack the person who created the threat.  
And, as the Model Penal Code makes clear, the force that was used must have been 
“immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself.”5  It is generally required 
that there must have been an overt act by the threatening individual that presented an 
imminent danger to the person who is claiming self-defense.6  Any desire by an 
                                                
*Bruce Gould Distinguished Professor of Law, Touro Law School; J.D., Harvard, 1972.  The author wishes 
to express his gratitude to his extraordinarily competent research assistants, Joseph Indusi and Andrew 
Bernstein.  
1 An Act which causes the death of another may be deemed to be justifiable self-defense if done to protect 
one’s own life. See, e.g., People v. Randle, 111 P.3d 987, 994 (Cal. 2005) (holding that a killing done in 
perfect self-defense is not murder or manslaughter, but justifiable homicide).  
2 People v. Goetz, 479 N.E.2d 41, 43 (N.Y. 1986). 
3 Corey Kilgannon, Jury Convicts Man Who Shot Teenager During Driveway Confrontation, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 23, 2008, available at 2007 WLNR 26196645. 
4 The original language used in the 1964 New York State legislative study bill regarding self-defense used 
the standard necessity concepts of lesser and greater evils.  Self-defense would apply when such “conduct 
is necessary to avoid a public or private injury or evil greater than that sought to be prevented by the law 
defining the offense charged.”  Commission Staff Notes, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (2009).  The Model 
Penal Code provides that there is a valid necessity defense when “the harm or evil sought to be avoided by 
such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged” MODEL 
PENAL CODE § 3.02 (1962).   
5 MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (emphasis added). 
6 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(a) (West 2008) (“[T]he use of force upon or toward another person is 
justifiable when the actor reasonably believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of 
protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.”); 18 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 505(a) (West 2008) (“The use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable 
when the actor believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself 
against the use of unlawful force by such other person on the present occasion.”). State v. Norman, 378 
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individual to use force to punish someone else for conduct others of his race may have 
previously engaged in, voids the claim of self-defense.  A vigilante who feels the need to 
take the law into his own hands is a criminal.  The desire to retaliate to make amends for 
past wrongs may be understandable, but our criminal justice system speaks clearly and in 
one voice:  No citizen is to act as judge and jury and inflict punishment.  Enforcement of 
the law and dealing with those who are violating the laws are for the police and the police 
alone. 
 
 Self-defense has been recognized as a valid defense throughout the history of our 
laws.  Blackstone’s Commentaries reports that “for the one uniform principle that runs 
through our own, and all other laws, seems to be this:  that where a crime, in itself capital, 
is endeavored to be committed by force, it is lawful to repel that force by the death of the 
party attempting.”7  The defense applied to a threat of assault, not just a potential killing:  
“The defense . . . is that whereby a man may protect himself from an assault, or the like, 
in the course of a sudden brawl or quarrel, by killing him who assaults him.”8  And in 
New York, the penal statutes have, since 1829, codified the common law right to use 
physical force in self-defense.9 
 
 Self-defense is generally considered to be, as it is in New York State, a 
Justification defense.10  Whereas defenses, which are labeled as Justifications, absolve the 
individual actor from any criminal liability for his conduct, the defenses considered to be 
Excuses have traditionally not led to the defendant’s release from liability.11  But the use 
of the phrase “justification” ought not to be interpreted as the criminal justice system’s 
approval of what had been done, but only that the conduct engaged in was understandable 
and will be tolerated without sanction.  The presence of justification does not in any way 
negate an element of the crime with which the defendant has been charged.12 
 
 The New York State Justification statute provides that an individual may use 
“physical force upon another person when and to the extent he or she reasonably believes 
such to be necessary to defend himself, herself or a third person from what he or she 
reasonably believes to be the use or imminent use of unlawful physical force by such 
other person[.]”13  Deadly physical force can be used only to defend oneself against the 
use of deadly physical force of another.14  It may at times become an issue for the jury to 
                                                
S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989) (“The right to kill in self-defense is based on the necessity . . . to kill [in order] to 
save oneself from imminent death or great bodily harm.”). 
7 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *181 (1765-1769). 
8 Id. at *184.  
9 1829 REV. STAT. OF N.Y., Part IV, Ch 1, Tit. II, § 3.   
10 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.10 (2009).  
11 J. L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 PROCEEDINGS ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y. 1, 2-3 (1956-1957) as 
republished SANFORD H. KADISH ET. AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 738 (8th ed. 2007) 
(Hereinafter KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW.) 
12 KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW at 737. 
13 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15 (2009).   
14 Id. at §35.15(2)(a).  
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determine whether the actor was truly confronted with the use of physical force that 
would be considered to be “deadly.”  The New York State Penal Law defines such force 
as constituting “physical force which, under the circumstances in which it is used, as 
readily capable of causing death or other serious physical injury.”15  As we shall see, the 
distinction between the accused use of deadly versus non-deadly force is crucial as to the 
obligation by the defendant to have retreated prior to the use of force.16 
 
 The Model Penal Code emphasizes the import of the defendant’s intentions when 
assessing whether or not he was using deadly force:  “A threat to cause death or serious 
bodily harm, by the production of a weapon or otherwise, as long as the actor’s purpose is 
limited to creating an apprehension that he will use deadly physical force if necessary, 
does not constitute deadly force.”17  The New York Penal Laws, however, do not provide 
for such an interpretation based upon an evaluation of the motives of the individual who 
threatens another with the use of deadly physical force. 
 
 The most problematic requirement for one who is claiming self-defense is the 
need to show that the threat that was being responded to was an “imminent” one.  
Imminent is generally thought of as immediate; if the threat confronting the accused had 
been the use of future force, there was no immediate threat and self-defense does not 
apply.18  If one acts in a pre-emptive manner to avoid even certain harm that will occur at 
a later date, self-defense is inapplicable.19  In this respect, the law of self-defense is 
analogous to the requirements for the use of any other necessity defense.20 
                                                
15 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00 (11) (2009). The Model Penal Code defines deadly force as that which is used 
of the purpose of “causing or that he knows to create a substantial risk of causing death or serious bodily 
injury.” MODEL PENAL CODE, § 3.11(2) (1962). 
16 See e.g., People v. Kruger, 603 N.E.2d 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 610 N.E.2d. 1270 (Ill. 
1993).  
17 MODEL PENAL CODE §3.11(2) (1962). 
18 People v. Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 172-73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989). 
19 Id. at 173. 
20 State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 (N.C. 1989) (“The right to kill in self-defense is based on the 
necessity, real or reasonably apparent, of killing an unlawful aggressor to save oneself from imminent death 
or great bodily harm at his hands.”) (emphasis added).  The North Carolina Supreme Court held that in 
spite of the fact the victim had a history of assaulting his wife at any time, there was no imminent threat 
existing at the time that the defendant killed her husband and therefore, the trial judge had committed no 
error in failing to charge the jurors on the law of self-defense.  Id. at 16.  In addition to evidence presented 
regarding the mental abuse by her husband due to alcoholism, evidence was presented that she sustained 
regular assaults and beatings, including, “slapping, punching and kicking her, striking her with various 
objects, and throwing glasses, beer bottles and other objects at her.”  Id. at 10.  The defendant described 
other specific incidents of abuse, such as her husband putting her cigarettes out on her, throwing hot coffee 
on her, breaking glass against her face and crushing food on her face.”  Id.  Further testimony revealed that 
“her husband did not work and forced her to make money by prostitution, and that he made humor of that 
fact to family and friends…He routinely called the defendant ‘dog,’ ‘bitch,’ and ‘whore,’ and on a few 
occasions made her eat pet food out of the pets’ bowls and bark like a dog.”  Id.  He often made her sleep 
on the floor, and at times, he deprived her of food and refused to let her get food for the family.  During 
those years of abuse, the defendant’s husband threatened numerous times to kill her and to maim her in 
various ways.  Id. at 9-10.  See also Commonwealth v. Sands, 553 S.E.2d 733, 737 (Va. 2001) (refusing to 
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 Were the threats against Goetz and White truly “imminent”?  To the extent that 
there has been any relaxing of the requirement that the threat be an imminent one, it has 
occurred in the context of the use of the battered woman’s syndrome.21  It has been found 
that in 20% of the cases in which a battered woman kills her accuser, there was no direct 
confrontation occurring at the time of the murder.22  In fact, 8% of the time the murdered 
husband had actually been sleeping.23  But law reformers and women’s advocacy groups 
attacked the requirement of an imminent threat as being too restricting for the unique 
position that many women found themselves to be in.24  A repeatedly battered woman 
may well be one who fears that the next attack could occur at any time; there was, so to 
speak, always the threat of an immediate attack.25 
 
 Were the threats against Goetz and White truly imminent or were the shootings by 
these men just a release of long-standing pent-up anger and hostility based, in part, on 
race?  Were the shootings attempts to retaliate for past abuses that they or their families 
suffered from blacks (in the case of Bernard Goetz) or whites (in the case of John 
White)? 
 
 An additional requirement for a valid self-defense is that the force used by the 
actor not have been excessive.26  Whereas it may have been appropriate and justified for 
an individual to have used deadly force to protect himself, was the force used in a manner 
that was disproportionate to the threat?  Would a use of lesser force have accomplished 
the goal of protecting oneself?  Did Goetz need to fire the fifth shot at Darryl Cabey, one 
of the would-be robbers who at that time was sitting at the end seat of the subway car?27  
Was it necessary for John White to have brought his 32 caliber Beretta out of his house 
and point it at the youths who had come to his home?28 
 
                                                
instruct the jurors as to self defense because the “evidence fails to reveal any overt act by [the defendant’s] 
husband that presented an imminent danger at the time of the shooting.”).  
21 See, e.g., State v. Janes, 850 P.2d 495 (Wash. 1993); State v. Gallegos, 719 P.2d 1268 (N.M. Ct. App. 
1986).  
22 Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in Current Reform 
Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 397 (1991). 
23 Id. 
24 See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984) (stating that expert testimony regarding battered 
woman’s syndrome is “relevant to the reasonableness of defendant’s belief that she was in imminent danger 
of death or serious injury.”). 
25Id. at 376-78.  The Court held that the expert may help the jury to realize that the battered wife “is 
particularly able to predict accurately the likely extent of violence in any attack on her.”  Id. at 378.   
26 See, State v. Clay, 256 S.E.2d 176 (N.C. 1979) (holding that any force greater than that which is 
necessary to protect oneself from an assault will be deemed excessive as a matter of law); People v. 
Colecchia, 674 N.Y.S.2d 10 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1998) (holding that once the threat of deadly physical 
force dissipates, the use of deadly physical force is excessive), appeal denied, 702 N.E.2d 844 (N.Y. 1998); 
People v. Stephenson, 571 N.E.2d 943 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 130 (Ill. 1991). 
27 Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 43 (N.Y. 1986).   
28 Kilgannon, supra note 3. 
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 If any one of the elements for the justification of self-defense fails, the defense is 
not valid.29  The threat against the individual must have been one with the potential of 
causing serious physical injury, the threat must have been an immediate one and the force 
used in defense must not have been excessive.30  Once the threat no longer exists, the 
necessity to use force has ended.31  In People v. Kruger,32 the court held that the right to 
use self-defense had terminated once the attacker had been shot and incapacitated 
because there was no longer any threat.33  The second shot, which was fired, therefore, 
was not done in self-defense.34 
 
 In New York State, self-defense is deemed to be an ordinary defense.35  Defenses, 
on the other hand, that are considered to be Excuses and not Justification defenses are 
labeled affirmative defenses.36  The distinction is one of great import.  For self-defense, 
the prosecutor has the burden of disproving the claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable 
doubt.37  Whenever the defendant has submitted evidence of self-defense, the court must 
then rule whether, as a matter of law, the defendant’s claimed facts if established would 
constitute self-defense.38  The Court is required to view the evidence in the light which is 
most favorable to the accused.39  There is no common law approach in New York to the 
defense, the requirements of Penal Law § 35.15 control.40  If the defendant has raised a 
colorable claim of self-defense, the judge has the obligation to instruct the jury as to the 
requirements needed to establish the defense.41  The justification charge that is required is 
                                                
29 Patrasso v. Nelson, 121 F.3d 297, 302-03 (7th Cir. 1997). 
30 Id. at 302 (citing People v. Zolidis, 450 N.E.2d 1290, 1294 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)) 
31 Rorie v. United States, 882 A.2d 763, 771 (D.C. 2005). 
32 603 N.E.2d 743 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).  
33 Id. at 745. 
34 Id. 
35 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05 (2009). 
36 See Peter H. Lagonikos, Affirmative Defenses Under New York’s Penal Law, 1998 No. 27 N.Y. Crim. L. 
News 1 (1998). See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.15 (2009) (stating that it is an affirmative defense that the 
actor “lacked criminal responsibility by reason of mental disease or defect …”); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 40.00 
(2009) (stating that it is an affirmative defense if “the defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct because 
he was coerced to do so …”); See also, N.Y. PENAL LAW §25.00 (2009) (stating that the statutory 
affirmative defenses shift the burden to the defendant to establish the defense by a preponderance of the 
evidence).  
37 People v. Steele, 260 N.E.2d 527 (N.Y. 1970).  
38 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.05(2) (2009).  
39 People v. McManus, 496 N.E.2d 202, 207 (N.Y. 1986).  
40 People v. Magliato, 496 N.E.2d 856, 857 (N.Y. 1986). 
41 See People v. Khan, 502 N.E.2d 987 (N.Y. 1986) (holding that the trial court erred in refusing to charge 
the jury regarding justification); People v. Dare, 562 N.Y.S.2d 251 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1991) (holding 
that assault, a crime involving the use of force, warranted the justification charge when evidence was 
introduced to support it), appeal denied, 586 N.E.2d 67 (1991); People v. Jones, 538 N.Y.S.2d 876 (App. 
Div. 2d Dep’t 1989) (holding that it was reversible error to omit the jury instruction permitting the jury to 
determine whether the force used by the defendant was deadly); People v. Suarez, 539 N.Y.S.2d 325 (App. 
Div. 1st Dep’t 1989) (holding that the trial court erred in giving justification defense when the defendants 
testimony supported self-defense); People v. Ortiz, 381 N.Y.S.2d 682 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1976) (holding 
that the trial court erred in not giving justification charge because portions of both the defense and 
prosecution evidence could have been believed). 
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to include an explanation of the burden of the prosecution to disprove the validity of the 
defense.42  The failure of the trial judge in New York to give the jury a justification 
charge is not to be deemed as mere harmless error.43 
 
 Some states hold it is not reversible error for the trial judge to fail to give the 
charge for self-defense if the defendant has not made a request for the jury instruction or 
has not presented evidence indicating self-defense.44  In California, it is considered to be 
reversible error to fail to give the charge for imperfect self-defense when evidence has 
been introduced to support the defense.45  Where self-defense is deemed to be an 
affirmative defense, the defendant may raise the defense only if he or the State presents 
evidence in support of the necessary elements of the defense.46 
 
 The burden for proving self-defense also varies according to jurisdiction. In some 
states, self-defense is designated as an affirmative defense that places the burden on the 
defendant to prove he or she acted in self-defense by a preponderance of the evidence.47  
The United Stated Supreme Court, in Martin v. Ohio,48 upheld the constitutionality of 
requiring the defendant to prove self-defense by preponderance for the evidence; such a 
requirement was found not to violate Due Process.49  Most jurisdictions follow the New 
York approach:  self-defense must be disproved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt 
once evidence is introduced relating to self-defense.50  The New Jersey Supreme Court in 
State v. Gardner,51 however, has ruled that it is erroneous to place the burden on the 
defendant:  “Once [the] proof appears either in the State’s case or defendant’s case in 
support of an allegation of self-defense, the State has the burden of proving that the 
defense is untrue.  And that the State must do so beyond a reasonable doubt.”52  
Similarly, a California jury instruction in People v. Cornett53 regarding self-defense was 
                                                
42 People v. Fermin, 828 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548-49 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2007), withdrawn, 868 N.E.2d 239 
(N.Y. 2007). 
43 People v. Young, 825 N.Y.S.2d 147, 151 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2006), appeal denied, 866 N.E.2d 465 
(N.Y. 2007) 
44 State v. Johnson, 234 N.W. 263, 264-65 (Iowa 1931). 
45 See, e.g., People v. Michaels, 49 P.3d 1032 (Cal. 2002) (holding that imperfect self-defense is not an 
affirmative defense for murder; the claimed version of the facts would establish the elements of voluntary 
manslaughter), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1058 (2003).  See also Aris, supra note 18, at 1192 (stating that 
substantial evidence of self-defense must be raised in order for the judge to give the instruction to the jury.)  
46 People v. Anderson, 601 N.E.2d 831, 836 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), appeal denied, 606 N.E.2d 1225 (Ill. 
1992). 
47 State v. Gillespie, 874 N.E.2d 870, 873 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007), See also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2901.05(A) (West 2008) (“The burden of going forward with the evidence of an affirmative defense, and 
the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, for an affirmative defense, is upon the accused.”). 
48480 U.S. 228 (1987). 
49 Id. at 233-34. 
50 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Walker, 820 N.E.2d 195, 201 (Mass. 2005).  See also State v. Singleton, 906 
A.2d 725 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (stating that the only burden on the defendant is production).  
51 242 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1968). 
52 Id. at 6. 
53198 P.2d 877 (Cal. 1948). 
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determined to be erroneous when the burden was placed on the defendant.54  The jury 
should have been instructed that the homicide is to be found to have been justified if the 
evidence as self-defense raises a reasonable doubt of guilt.55  South Carolina, however, 
departs from the majority and requires the defendant to prove by the greater weight of the 
evidence that he acted in self-defense.56 
  
Courts and legislatures throughout the country have wrestled with the standard to 
be used in assessing whether or not the accused acted reasonably when he concluded that 
he was being threatened with the imminent use of deadly physical force. Should there be 
a subjective standard, wherein self-defense would be warranted as long as that particular 
individual believed he was threatened?  Or, should the standard be an objective one, and 
only if a reasonable person would have felt threatened would the defense be appropriate. 
  
The courts at three different levels in New York considered this issue in the 
Bernhard Goetz case.  The New York State Supreme Court judge who was assigned to be 
the trial judge for Goetz considered a motion by the defendant to dismiss the Grand Jury 
indictment because of an incorrect instruction provided by the prosecutor as to the 
appropriate standard to be used in assessing the claim by Goetz that he was confronted 
with an imminent threat.57 
 
 As was stated by Judge Crane, “[t]he case presents a challenging question”58 and 
the context arises from “one of the most difficult criminal cases of our generation”59 
which has “galvanized the world.”60  The prosecutor had told the grand jurors that  
 
So there’s both a subjective and objective element to this.  First 
of all, you have to determine whether the defendant, in his own 
mind, believed he was in the kind of peril that permitted him to 
use deadly physical force. You must also then determine whether 
his response was reasonable under the circumstances, whether 
that was the action – the response was the action that he – that a 
reasonable man who found himself in the defendant’s situation 
and if it was unreasonably excessive or – or otherwise 
unjustifiable it – then the defense, would not be made out and the 
third element is retreat.61 
                                                
54 Id. at 885. 
55Id. Self-defense must be disproved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt.  The jury instruction 
contained the words “absolutely necessary” in reference to the elements of self-defense.  The court on 
appeal held this to be prejudicial, possibly causing the jurors to believe the force must have been “actually 
necessary.”  Id. at 881-82 
56 See, e.g., State v. McDowell, 249 S.E.2d 916 (S.C. 1978). 
57People v. Goetz, 502 N.Y.S.2d 577, 579 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., 1986). 
58 Id. at 578. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. at 580. 
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The defendant maintained that the italicized language above incorrectly conveyed an 
objective standard.62  Whereas the prosecutor contended that the hybrid standard was 
appropriate, Goetz maintained that the appropriate standard ought to be fully a subjective 
one.63  Were the prosecutor’s statement on this issue to be incorrect, the indictment would 
have to be dismissed. 
 
 The Court cited the following language for a requested justification charge which 
is contained in the New York Defender Digest:  “The test the law requires you to use in 
deciding what this defendant was reasonably justified in believing is what this defendant 
himself, subjectively, had reason to believe – not what yourself or some other person 
might reasonably believe.”64  The Court concluded that indeed the prosecutor’s 
explanation of the law regarding the justification defense was error and that “the error 
impaired the integrity of the Grand Jury and prejudiced defendant.”65  The Court did, 
however, provide permission to the prosecutor to resubmit the case to another grand 
jury.66 
  
The Office of the Manhattan District Attorney appealed Judge Crane’s order 
dismissing the nine counts of the indictment against Goetz.67  Three months later, the 
First Department of the New York State Appellate Division considered the matter.68  
Once again, language was used to highlight the import of the Goetz prosecution:  “This 
appeal poses a critical legal issue in a most significant criminal case.”69  The court found 
it necessary to cut through the “confusion”70 and “the rhetoric”71 and the “media 
sensationalism”72 and “heat”73 that have surrounded the matter. 
 
  The Appellate Division once again focused on the need for the grand jurors to 
have realized that it was the subjective state of mind of the defendant that was of crucial 
import.74  It was the moral culpability of the defendant that determined liability,75 and it 
was improper to resort to the standard of the reasonable person used in civil cases 
involving claims of negligence.76  The prosecutor’s instruction to the grand jurors was not 
                                                
62 Goetz, 502 N.Y.S. 2d at 581. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 583  
65 Id. at 584. 
66 Id. at 585. 
67 People v. Goetz, 501 N.Y.S.2d 326 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1986). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 327 (emphasis added). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Goetz, 507 N.Y.S.2d at 327. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 318. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 323. 
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a fair statement of the law of self-defense, and the indictment needed to be dismissed.77  
An angry dissenting opinion maintained that the court’s ruling would give “legal excuse 
to any hot-tempered individual, fearful neurotic or simply excessively self-righteous 
person who rashly uses deadly force.”78 
 
 The Court of Appeals, the highest court in New York State, reinstated the 
indictment against Goetz.79  The prosecutor’s explanation to the grand jurors about the 
appropriate standard was correct.80  The law in New York was clearly laid out:  The first 
task of the jurors would be to determine whether the defendant believed that the deadly 
force was necessary to protect himself from an imminent use of deadly force against 
him.81  If such a finding were to be made, then the jury is to assess whether those beliefs 
of the defendant were reasonable, could a reasonable person in light of all the existing 
circumstances have maintained such a belief.82 
 
 Some states have attempted to deal with the objective/subjective dilemma by 
creating what is referred to as an imperfect self-defense.83  The perfect self-defense 
applies if a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would have believed he was in 
imminent danger.84  Such a defense justifies the response of the defendant to the threat 
and an acquittal of the charges is to result.85 The imperfect self-defense applies when the 
defendant did have an honest belief that he was being threatened, but such belief was not 
considered by the trier of fact to have been a reasonable one.86  The impact of such an 
imperfect self-defense is not to acquit the defendant, but rather serves to act in 
mitigation.87  A murder charge will typically be reduced to manslaughter if an imperfect 
self-defense is found.88 
 
 The most common instance that leads to the imperfect self-defense charge is when 
the defendant’s perception of the threat meets the test under the subjective prong and not 
the objective prong.89  If there is no such a charge informing jurors of the existence of an 
                                                
77 Goetz, 501 N.Y.S.2d at 331-32. 
78 Id. at 341-42 (Asch, J., dissenting). 
79 People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986). 
80 Id. at 52. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. The decision of the court was a unanimous one and was written by the Chief Judge of the Court, Sol 
Wachtler.  See id. at 98. 
83 See, e.g., Faulkner v. State, 458 A.2d 81 (Md. 1983), aff’d, 483 A.2d 759 (Md. 1984). 
84 Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 47. 
85 State v. Peterson, 857 A.2d 1132, 1147 (Md. 2004). 
86 In re Christian S., 872 P.2d 574, 575 (Cal. 1994).  
87 State v. Kirkpatrick, 184 P.3d 247, 256 (Kan. 2008).  
88 See, e.g., Richmond v. State, 623 A.2d 630, 632 (Md. 1993).  Maryland only allowed imperfect self-
defense to mitigate a murder charge until recently when Richmond was overruled by Christian v. State, 951 
A.2d 832 (Md. 2008) (holding that imperfect self-defense will mitigate a charge of first degree assault). 
89 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3403(b) (2008) (“Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional killing of a 
human being committed . . . upon an unreasonable but honest belief that circumstances existed that justified 
deadly force . . .”).  
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imperfect self-defense, the defendant will be guilty of murder because the “perfect” self-
defense will fail.90  For example, in State v. Shaw,91 the defendant wanted a jury 
instruction for imperfect self-defense, however the state of Vermont does not allow for 
this charge and a murder conviction resulted.92  California, however, recognizes 
imperfect self-defense to be a mitigating factor if it is found that the defendant had a 
sincere belief that he or she was in imminent danger of death or serious physical injury 
but this belief was determined to have been unreasonable.93  In Christian S.,94 alleged 
members of a California gang harassed the defendant for over a year, and in response, the 
fearful defendant started carrying a pistol.95  On one occasion, there was a dispute 
concerning damage to a truck, and the defendant drew his weapon as the victim 
continued to approach him; the victim taunted the defendant and dared him to shoot.96  
The defendant shot and killed the victim from twenty feet away.97  The defense claimed 
that however unreasonable the killing might appear to be, the defendant did have an 
honest fear of imminent death or serious physical injury which therefore served to negate 
the element of malice required for murder.98  The defense contended that at most a 
conviction of voluntary manslaughter would be warranted.99  The California Supreme 
Court held that a charge of imperfect self-defense should be permitted.100  The Court held 
that if the defendant honestly believed that he was shooting because of an imminent fear 
of death or serious physical injury, the murder charge should be reduced to manslaughter 
because even though the shooting was intentional, the imperfect self-defense negated the 
element of malice required for a conviction of murder.101 
 
 In Pennsylvania, the statue is clear:  “[A] person who intentionally or knowingly 
kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he 
believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the killing … but 
his belief is unreasonable.”102  The Model Penal Code allows for mitigation but not 
justification of a murder charge if the defendant had a subjective but mistaken belief 
regarding a threat and was “reckless or negligent in having such belief or acquiring or 
failing to acquire any knowledge or belief which is material to the justifiability of his use 
of force….”103 
                                                
90 State v. Shaw, 721 A.2d 486, 491-92 (Vt. 1998). 
91 Id.  
92 Id. at 489. 
93 In re Christian S., 872 P.2d at 575. 
94 872 P.2d 574, 575 (Cal. 1994). 
95 Id. at 575. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. See also, CAL. PENAL CODE § 187(a) (West 2008) (“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, 
or a fetus, with malice aforethought.”).   
99 In re Christian S., supra note 93. 
100 Id. at 583. 
101 Id. 
102 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503(b) (West 1995). 
103 MODEL PENAL CODE §3.09(2) (Proposed Official Draft 1962); See also MODEL PENAL CODE §3.04(1) 
(stating “the use of force upon or toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that such 
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 Some States permit an imperfect self-defense jury instruction to be given to the 
jury when the defendant fails to meet one element required for a “perfect” self-defense.104  
In Swann v. U.S.,105 the D.C. Court of Appeals allowed the charge when the defendant 
was the initial aggressor (which negates the applicability of self-defense) but acted due to 
a subjective fear of imminent death or serious physical injury.106 The Court determined 
that “a defendant’s actual belief both in the presence of danger and in the need to resort to 
force, even if one or both beliefs be objectively unreasonable, constitutes a legally 
sufficient mitigating factor to warrant a finding of voluntary manslaughter rather than 
second degree murder.”107 
 
 New York State law imposes a major restriction on the use of self-defense.  An 
individual cannot use deadly force to defend oneself if “knows that with complete safety 
to oneself and others he or she may avoid the necessity of so doing by retreating.”108  
Could Bernhard Goetz have retreated from the threat, if indeed such a threat existed, by 
merely proceeding to move from one car to another in the subway train that he and the 
four youths were in?109  Could he have waited for the subway to arrive at a station and 
then exited onto the platform?  Could John White have left the scene of the confrontation 
with the four youths and retreated into his house and locked the door and called the 
police?110 
 
 The doctrine of retreat can be traced back to English common law.111 Deadly 
force was permitted to be used only when an individual had his “back to the wall.”112  It 
was initially required that one had to have attempted to flee the scene altogether; if that 
proved impossible, one must attempt to get as far away as possible from the enemy – 
                                                
force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use of unlawful force by 
such person on the present occasion.”). 
104 See, e.g., State v. Larry, 481 S.E.2d. 907 (N.C. 1997) (“[i]mperfect self-defense renders a defendant 
guilty of at least voluntary manslaughter if the first two elements above exist at the time of the killing but 
the defendant, without murderous intent, either was the aggressor in bringing on the affray or used 
excessive force.”), cert. denied, 552 F.3d 356 (2009).  
105 648 A.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
106 Id. at 932. 
107 Id. at 931. 
108 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a) (N.Y. 2009). 
109 Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 43. 
110 See Kilgannon, supra note 3. 
111Jason W. Bobo, Following the Trend, Alabama Abandons the Duty to Retreat and Encourages Citizens 
to Stand Their Ground, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 339, 346 (2008).  (“At the core of Blackstone’s view was the 
centuries-long English common-law tradition that supported the idea of all homicides as public wrongs.” 
Id. at 341.  Therefore, in order to avoid any use of force that may lead to a death, one had the obligation to 
retreat.  Id. at 342). 
112 Id. at 342.  Professor Richard Maxwell Brown describes the “back to the wall” test:  When another 
person attacks you, you must not defend yourself with violence until you have attempted to flee from the 
scene.  If you were unable to flee from the scene, you must retreat as far as possible from your enemy until 
the wall is at your back.  Then, and only then, may you legally face your opponent and kill him in self-
defense.  Even with the wall at your back, there must be the need to save yourself from grievous harm.  Id.  
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until one’s back was up against the wall.113  It was only at that time, were the threat to 
still be continuing, that one may use force in self-defense.114  The long-standing common 
law exception to the obligation to retreat if assault--and not murder--was the charge 
against the defendant, was changed in New York by statute requiring retreat before self-
defense in any instance could be claimed.115 
 
 The provisions of the Model Penal Code, which relate to retreat, are virtually 
identical to those in New York.116  There are, however great difficulties in the application 
of the retreat doctrine.  First, the test is a subjective one.117  An actor is required to have 
known that he had the option of a completely safe retreat.118  But how can the prosecutor 
be expected to show that the defendant actually had such knowledge and that, therefore, 
the use of deadly force was not necessary?  The fact-finders are not to apply a reasonable 
person standard and assume, therefore, that this defendant knew of the retreat option.119  
Any charge to the jury that indicates that an objective standard is to be used is improper 
and if a conviction results subsequent to such an instruction by the court, it will be 
overturned.120  Certainly, if the defendant were to testify at trial, he will claim that he 
never believed that he could just leave the scene with complete safety. 
 
 And, indeed it is “complete” safety that is required.121  In State v. Anderson,122 the 
Supreme Court of Connecticut overturned the defendant’s conviction because the judge’s 
instructions to the jury had failed to use the words “complete safety.”123  In the common 
situation where the aggressor possesses a gun and is threatening its use, how can a jury 
determine that the defendant knew he could retreat from the threat in complete safety? 
Because, in part, of these practical concerns, there has recently been a steady trend in the 
number of states which are abolishing the retreat requirement.124   
 
It was in Ohio, in 1876, where the “true man” concept originated.125  A “true 
man” is not a coward who retreats from a confrontation; a “true man” stands his ground 
and uses the force required to meet the threat.126  It has not been the courts that have led 
                                                
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 342-43. 
115 People v. Dingley, 366 N.E. 2d 877 (N.Y. 1977). 
116 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (2)(b)(ii) (self-defense is not justifiable “if the actor knows he can avoid 
the necessity of using such force with complete safety by retreating”). 
117 Id. 
118 Id. (emphasis added). See, e.g., Mosby v. Devine, 851 A.2d 1031, 1043 (R.I. 2004) (stating before one 
may employ deadly force, he or she must retreat “when an open, safe avenue of escape is available and he 
[or she] is consciously aware of this fact.”). 
119 People v. La Susa, 447 N.Y.S.2d 738 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1982). 
120 See id. 
121 State v. Saunders, 838 A.2d 186, 194 (Conn. 2004), cert. denied, 124 U.S. 2113 (2004). 
122 631 A.2d 1149 (Conn. 1995). 
123 Id. at 1155. 
124 Culverson v. State, 797 P.2d 238, 240 (Nev. 1990). 
125 See Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199 (1876). 
126 State v. Renner, 912 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Tenn. 1995). 
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the way to the departures from the requirement of retreat.  In a two-year period, the 
legislatures of fifteen states have enacted what are commonly referred to as “stand your 
ground laws.”127  The National Rifle Association has aggressively lobbied for abolition of 
the retreat requirement and these efforts have led a total of 30 states in the years 2005-
2007 to consider changing their laws on self-defense.128  A spokesperson for the National 
Rifle Association justified its support for the anti-retreat legislation in that law-abiding 
citizens should know that “if they make a decision to save their lives in the split second 
they are being attacked, the law is on their side.”129 
 
 The new statutes are often shaped by the “Stand Your Ground” laws enacted in 
Florida in 2005.130  The new legislation is clear.  If an individual is attacked in a place 
where he has a right to be, then he has “no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or 
her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he or she reasonably 
believes it is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or 
another.”131 
 
 Even in those states such as New York that still adhere to the retreat doctrine, 
there is an exception provided for one who is in his own home at the time of the threat.132  
Justice Cardozo, in the 1914 case of People v. Tomlins,133 explained the rationale: 
“It is not now and never has been the law that a man assailed in his own dwelling is 
bound to retreat.  If assailed there, he may stand his ground, and resist the attack.  He is 
under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a fugitive from his own home.”134 
 
 In New York State, as is true in virtually every state as well as the Model Penal 
Code, the initial aggressor in the conflict cannot claim a justified use of self-defense.135  
Whereas there often is not a clarification within the penal codes as to what exactly 
designates one the initial aggressor,136 it is generally accepted that the person who is at 
                                                
127 Adam Liptak, 15 States Expand Right to Shoot in Self-Defense, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2006, available at 
2006 WLNR 13604882. 
128 P. Luevonda Ross, The Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle Association-Inspired 
Statutes:  From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right to Stand Your Ground, 35 S.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007). 
129 See Liptak, supra note 127. 
130 See FLA. STAT. §776.013(3) (2008). 
131 Id.  
132 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a)(i) (2009) (“The actor is under no duty to retreat if he or she is in his 
or her dwelling”); See also MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A)(1962) (stating “the actor is not obliged 
to retreat from his dwelling or place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his place 
of work by another person whose place of work the actor knows it to be.”). 
133 107 N.E. 496 (N.Y. 1914). 
134 Id., at 497. 
135 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(b) (2009) (stating “[a] person may … defend himself … unless: … 
[t]he actor was the initial aggressor …”); See also MODEL PENAL CODE §3.04(2)(b)(i) (1962) (stating “the 
actor, with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily injury, provoked the use of force against himself 
in the same encounter.”). 
136 The New York Penal Code, for example, merely states that self-defense is not available to “the initial 
aggressor.” See id. § 35.15(2)(a)(1).  
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fault for provoking the confrontation is considered to be the initial aggressor.137  Another 
common formulation of this restriction on the use of self-defense was stated by the court 
in Nowlin v. United States:138  “Appellant had no legitimate claim to the defense of self-
defense since he had voluntarily placed himself in a position which he could reasonably 
expect would result in violence.”139 
 
 Had John White been the initial aggressor when he left his house carrying a 
loaded 32 caliber gun?140  Had he not placed himself in a position that one could expect 
to lead to violence?  Did Bernhard Goetz not provoke the confrontation when he took out 
his gun in the subway?141  Or did the victim of his violence “start the whole thing” by 
saying to Goetz, “Give me five dollars”?142  If either John White or Bernhard Goetz were 
the initial aggressors, their self-defense claim is inappropriate and invalid. 
 
 “Words” are what both John White and Bernhard Goetz claim led them to fear for 
their or others safety, and therein provoked the violent response.  To John White, the 
words said to his son at a party, followed by the words said in a phone call, followed by 
words said once White approached the four men with his gun,143 caused him to fear for 
his or his son’s safety.  Certainly, “fighting words” exist.  There are words, as the 
Supreme Court held in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,144 which “by their very utterance 
inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”145 
 
 Whereas it might well be maintained by the prosecution that both Goetz and 
White were the initial aggressors because they are the ones who introduced the threatened 
use of deadly physical force,146 one aspect of the law relating to the initial aggressor does 
not seem to apply.  New York State law provides that the use of physical force by the 
initial aggressor would be justifiable “if the actor has withdrawn from the encounter and 
effectively communicated such withdrawal to such other person but the latter persists in 
continuing the incident by the use or threatened imminent use of unlawful physical 
force.”147  Once Goetz and White introduced their guns into the scene, there was no 
subsequent attempt by them to withdraw their threatened use of deadly force. 
 
 
                                                
137 U.S. v. Slocum, 486 F.Supp.2d 1104, 1108-09 (C.D. Cal. 2007).  Defendant must show he “was free 
from fault in provoking or continuing the difficulty which resulted in the slaying.”  Id. at 1108. 
138 382 A.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
139 Id. at 14, n.7. 
140 See Kilgannon, supra note 3.   
141 See Goetz, 497 N.E.2d at 43. 
142 Id.  
143 See Kilgannon supra note 3. 
144 315 U.S. 568 (1942). 
145 Id. at 572. 
146 In some states, if the actor is “even slightly at fault,” self-defense will not be available.  See Perricllia v. 
Commonwealth, 326 S.E.2d 679, 685 (V.A. 1985). 
147 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(1)(b) (2009). 
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Conclusion 
  
There are direct and strong parallels between the use of deadly physical force by 
Bernhard Goetz and John White.  Each claimed that he was confronted with a threat from 
others that was imminent.  Each claimed that his use of a gun to protect himself was 
justified.  Each claim was made even though there was no weapon used or shown by 
those who allegedly were the source of the threat.  In both instances, the defendants were 
in unlawful possession of their guns.  In neither instance, did the defendants retreat after 
the initial showing of their weapon.  Whereas the defense in the White case clearly and 
forcefully told the jurors “[r]ace … is very much a part of this case,”148 counsel for Goetz 
was less direct but no less clear.149     
  
The Goetz and White cases were intriguing because they present such critical 
challenges to the standard that ought to be used in determining whether an individual has 
acted reasonably in using deadly physical force to defend oneself.  The crucial issue of 
race, especially when used to justify the use of armed force in self-defense, makes the 
                                                
148 Transcript of Record at 2541, People v. White, No. 2662A-06 (Suffolk County Sup. Ct. Mar. 19, 2008) 
(unpublished opinion).  During closing arguments, Frederick Brewington elaborated as to the manner in 
which race prompted the very incident that occurred on the night of the shooting.  Id. at 2541-45.  
Brewington explained how Daniel Cicciaro and his friends felt that “they had the right to go to Aaron’s 
house … and essentially terrorize the entire family,” because Aaron White was black and Jenny Martin, 
whom he allegedly had raped, was white.  Id.  Upon arrival at the house, Cicciaro and friends questioned 
Aaron, saying “Who the f* do you think you are, n*? … I’m going to f* you and your mother.” Id. at 2542.  
John White was unfortunately all too familiar with “the Klan … They pull up.  They blind you with their 
lights.  They burn your house.  They threaten you.  That’s how they come.”  Id. at 2543.  Brewington 
rebutted the claim that race was not a factor in the conflict by emphatically stating that “this case has 
everything to do [with] race.” Racial Violence and Self-Defense, 4 Journal of Race, Gender and Ethnicity 2 
at 14 (2008) Brewington explained, 
[R]ace was key, particularly for this defendant both in speaking from a subjective 
standpoint and an objective standpoint.  The Issue of race was not only one that was 
raised by Mr. White, but that was confirmed by Aaron and the witnesses that the People 
put on.  The claim that they did not use initially any racial epithets against the White 
family became very untrue and disproven through cross-examination.  We were able to 
get one of the individuals to say we might have said it once or twice. It was a tape of 
one of the friends of Daniel Cicero who was in the car with them and the phone had a 
call 911 that had been left open, the line was left open, and you heard the individual 
saying, Mr. Servano was his name, “don’t worry Danno we are going to get those f*ing 
n*” for you.” … Race had everything to do with it in this case.  Id. 
149 Goetz’s attorney requested the Guardian Angels, a group of young men and women who were strong 
supporters of the need for those other than police officers to aggressively respond to street criminals, to 
bring to court four black youths to portray the four individuals who were shot by Goetz for a re-enactment 
of the crime scene.  Mark Baker, Goetz’s attorney, commented, “we got criticized for doing that by the 
District Attorney.” See Racial Violence and Self-Defense, 4 Journal of Race, Gender and Ethnicity 2 at 18 
(2008).  But it’s not as if this re-creation of the crime was needed to remind jurors of the significance of 
race.  Baker commented, “I had a photograph of each [black] kid blown up … on big posters … three feet 
by five feet facing that jury for seven weeks … they were violent photographs and that was the atmosphere 
we tried to create.”  Id. at 21.  When Baker was asked about playing on the racist feelings of the jurors, only 
two of whom were black, Baker responded that, “I didn’t create the color of their skins.”  Id. at 24.    
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resolution of the issues presented in this article both all the more complex and all the 
more compelling.  
 
 
